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Abstract 
Venture capital can be vital to innovative and growth-oriented start-ups and small 
businesses in need of external capital. Since July 2013, when the Regulation on 
European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA) came into force, it has not had much 
success or attracted much attention. European venture capital funds are far from being 
systemically relevant and suffer from multiple supply-side failures and structural 
weaknesses; namely a lack of private-sector investors; fragmentation; small fund size; 
limited access to international money; low investment interest; low current and 
expected performance; and a big funding gap with the US. The Commission’s proposed 
changes to the existing regulation, published 14 July 2016, includes an extension of the 
range of managers eligible to market and manage EuVECA, an increase in the range of 
companies that EuVECA can invest in, and simplified registration and cross-border 
marketing of EuVECA. These proposals will now be discussed in the European 
Parliament and the EU Council. This paper argues, however, that they fail to address 
three important issues that could further boost financing: the extension of the EuVECA 
Regulation to third-country managers, the reduction of the €100,000 entry ticket 
without further compromises on investor protection, and harmonisation of rules on 
managing requirements. Finally, it discusses measures that facilitate access to financing 
for start-ups and SMEs: i) common/harmonised legislation, ii) harmonisation of tax 
treatment, tax rates and tax relief processes, iii) promotion of social/impact investment, 
iv) bridging early-stage ecosystem to secondary markets and v) improved training and 
support to bring more investors on board. 
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Nothing ventured nothing gained: 
How the EU can boost growth in 
small businesses and start-ups 
ECMI Research Report No. 10/November 2016 
Apostolos Thomadakis* 
1. Introduction 
The EU’s decision to create a Capital Markets Union (CMU) to mobilise capital across the region means 
that Europe is now ready to address issues of regional competitiveness, growth and jobs. Indeed, 
financing growth and innovation is one of the focal points of the Commission’s Green Paper,1 which 
advocates expanding the pool of both investible assets and potential investors. Once the CMU is put in 
place Europe is likely to be better off than it is today in terms of cross-border capital markets.  
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups are the backbone of the European Union’s 
economic development, yet they find it difficult to access finance and boost their growth. Since the 
global financial crisis, bank lending has become scarce and entrepreneurs have to take risks and look 
for new sources of money. Moreover, given the volatility of the stock market and the zero- to negative- 
returns delivered by the bond market (safe haven), alternative investments (e.g. small cap) become a 
more attractive and necessary option. One of these alternative investments is venture capital (VC). 
Venture capital has been a key source of finance for commercialising radical innovations.2 Unlike other 
forms of external finance, a key feature of VC is that it facilitates the provision of funding to start-up 
firms, despite the huge risks associated with unproven technologies or inventions. Since start-ups with 
new technologies rarely have internal cash flow to draw upon and are too risky to obtain debt finance, 
they critically depend on the provision of VC for their survival.  
With the aim of promoting investment in start-ups and SMEs, opening up new areas of growth and 
moving towards an innovation-led economy, the Regulation on European Venture Capital Funds 
(EuVECA) came into force in July 2013. The Regulation aims to support young and innovative firms 
by investing in privately held undertakings with an annual turnover of less than €50 million (or an 
annual balance sheet of less than €43 million) and fewer than 250 employees. Since July 2013, the 
facilities have been available to fund managers with a total value of assets under management of €500 
million or less, and can be marketed across the European Economic Area (EEA) – composed of the EU 
member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway – to both professional and non-professional 
investors who commit a minimum of €100,000 to the fund.  
                                                     
* Apostolos Thomadakis, Ph.D. is Researcher at ECMI. 
1 See European Commission (2015a). 
2 The focus of this paper is on VC that the European Commission (2012) defines as “investment in unquoted 
companies by investment funds (venture capital funds) that, acting as principals, manage individual, institutional 
or in-house money and includes early-stage and expansion financing, but not replacement finance and buy-outs. 
Strictly defined, venture capital is a subset of private equity…” On the other hand, private equity (PE) can be 
defined as a form of medium- to long-term equity investment in private companies not listed on the stock 
exchange. 
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Even though the EuVECA Regulation has had some initial success and is starting to be accepted by the 
market, the very small number of applications3 and the speed with which the text was produced have 
exposed a number of issues, including a lack of knowledge and understanding of the way the venture 
capital industry operates. Against this background, the European Commission published a consultation 
on the review of the EuVECA Regulation in September 2015, which led to a proposed amendment in 
July 2016. 
Taking this latter action as its point of departure, this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses 
the supply-side failures and structural weaknesses of EuVECA, while section 3 addresses the current 
limitations of the EuVECA Regulation. Section 4 describes the Commission’s proposed amendments 
to the Regulation; section 5 calls for further action; section 6 offers some long-term policy 
recommendations and section 7 concludes. 
2. The venture capital market 
The venture capital industry has a longstanding commitment to encourage and facilitate long-term 
investment. As recognised by the European Commission (2013) in its Green Paper on Long-term 
financing of the European economy, and given the longer time horizons of their business models, 
institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds and endowments) represent 
suitable providers of long-term financing. Total assets under management (AuM) in Europe increased 
by 9% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, to reach an estimated €19 trillion at the end of 2014. This brought the 
ratio of AuM to aggregate European GDP to 124% of GDP at the end of 2014.4  
2.1 Lack of private-sector investors 
Despite this large amount of available capital, European innovation continues to be faced with a lack of 
private-sector investors in venture capital. Many private investors/Limited Partners (LPs) no longer 
invest in the European VC asset class due to the associated higher risks and lower performance returns. 
Start-ups and early-stage growth firms have yielded poor returns, which has deterred the private sector 
from returning to this asset class.  
On the other hand, the supportive tax environment for individual investors, such as business angels and 
other high-net worth investors, provides a powerful incentive for early-stage investors, but also 
considerably reduces the real downside on an investment. These tax ‘benefits’, however, should only 
aim to encourage investment and change the risk profile of start-ups and are not meant to be a tool to 
reduce the tax burden of wealthy individuals. 
In response to private investors withdrawing from the market, the public sector stepped in to maintain 
the availability of risk-capital financing during the global economic and financial crises. According to 
Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data (Figure 1), in 2015, government agencies contributed 31% of the 
funds raised, followed by funds of funds and other asset managers (22%), corporate investors (14%), 
and family offices and private individuals (12%).  
On an aggregate basis between 2007 and 2015, the share of total funds raised by pension funds, 
insurance companies and banks fell from 32% to just 11% in 2015. Over the same period, contributions 
by government agencies grew considerably. While in 2007 government agencies accounted for 14% of 
investment in European venture capital, by 2015 their share had increased to 31% of venture funding. 
                                                     
3 In July 2016, 70 EuVECA funds had been notified to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). 
However, the register contains only 20 such funds (11 in Germany, five in Ireland, two in Spain, and one in France 
and Latvia). Moreover, the number of registrations per year is decreasing: one registration in 2013, nine in 2014, 
seven in 2015 and only three in 2016 (as of late November). 
4 Asset Management in Europe, 8th Annual Review, EFAMA. 
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Figure 1. Venture capital - Funds raised by type of investor (% of total amount) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
 
2.2 Fragmentation  
This trend towards increased reliance on public-sector investment could be exacerbated in the coming 
years as new prudential regulation comes into effect.5 Institutional investors will be under pressure to 
reduce their investments in long-term, illiquid investments, and commitments to private equity are also 
likely to be affected. As a consequence, venture capital, as the smallest part of the private equity industry 
and the one that is most willing to back more innovative (and thus riskier) European companies, is in 
danger of being cut out entirely from the asset allocation strategies of banks, insurance companies and 
occupational pension schemes. Data for 2015 show that venture capital, in comparison with other asset 
classes, accounted for only €5.3 billion (11.2%) in terms of fundraising and €4 billion (8.4%) in terms 
of investments (Figures 2 and 3).  
                                                     
5 The European Commission’s legislative proposals include: i) a framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitisation, ii) new prudential calibrations for banks in the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR), iii) an adjustment to the Solvency II legislation to make it easier for insurers to invest in infrastructure and 
European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs), iv) a framework for a pan-European covered bond market and 
v) the European Venture Capital (EuVECA) and European Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF) Regulations.  
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Figure 2. Incremental amounts raised by type of fund (€ billion) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
 
Figure 3. Amount of equity investment by type of fund (€ billion) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
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2.3 Fund size 
While the European venture capital fund was relatively small until 2013, things have changed 
significantly since 2014 (Figure 4). Between 2006 and 2013, the average size of European VC funds 
was €55 million and the median fund size only amounted to €18.7 million; 50% of all European venture 
capital funds were smaller than €18.7 million. On the other hand, in 2014-15 the average size increased 
to €113 million, while the median to €59 million.6  
Figure 4. Median and average EU VC fund size (€ million) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook 2Q 2016 European Venture Industry Report. 
 
2.4 Access to international money 
Due to their small fund size, however, it is difficult for venture capital managers to raise capital outside 
of Europe and to take advantage of a more general geographic shift in the sources of long-term 
institutional private capital. Latest data from the European Investment Fund (EIF) – one of the biggest 
providers of risk capital, in particular of VC to young and innovative European start-ups – show that 
the fundraising volumes backed by the EIF in 2014 amount to 45% of the overall volumes collected by 
European VC investors. Similarly, the investment activity backed by EIF represented 41% of total 
investment in Europe in 2014.7 From figures 5 and 6 it is evident that European venture capital does 
not have access to large pools of international capital. 
                                                     
6 This increase is largely attributed to the EuVECA Regulation that came into force on 22 July 2013 and aimed to 
encourage investments by VC funds in small and innovative firms in order to boost economic growth. 
7 These numbers correspond to early stage and later stage fundraising activity, as well as seed and start-up stage 
investment, respectively, EIF (2016).  
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Figure 5. EU VC fundraising by source of fund (% of total amount) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
 
Figure 6. EU VC investment by region (% of total amount) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Invest Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
 
2.5 Level of investment interest 
International investors have gradually lost interest in European venture capital. Data from the Global 
Private Equity Barometer8 show that when compared to other private equity investment options, 
European VC is perceived as one of the least favourable private equity sectors to invest in.  
                                                     
8 Colles Capital’s Global Private Equity Barometer provides an overview of worldwide trends in private equity, 
based on the plans and opinions of institutional investors in private equity (limited partners) based in North 
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The winter 2013-14 edition of the survey anticipated that investors will scale back their exposure to 
European VC and large buyout investments (due to higher risk) over the next two-to-three years, while 
small and mid-market buyout transactions will offer the best private equity opportunities. In particular, 
35-40% (5-10%) of LPs planned to decrease (increase) their new commitments in EU VC, and 30-35% 
of LPs to increase their exposure to small and mid-market buyout funds. 
The picture from the latest survey (summer 2016) is similar, even though the magnitude of investors 
planning to decrease their EU VC exposure has now moderated (7%). In particular, LPs are planning to 
maintain their exposure to VC and to build their exposure to small and mid-market buyout funds, growth 
capital and private debt over the next two-to-three years. Finally, investors are pursuing similar 
strategies for North American and European private equity, as can be seen from Table 1. 
Table 1. LP investment strategies for North American and European PE 
over the next 2-3 years (% of respondents) 
 North America Europe 
Large buyouts -21% / +10% -17% / +13% 
Mid-market buyouts -5% / +42% -5% / +36% 
Small buyouts -4% / +41% -6% / +32% 
Growth/expansion capital -4% / +26% -6% / +26% 
Venture capital -7% / +11% -7% / +8% 
Private debt/credit -8% / +27% -5% / +24% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Global Private Equity Barometer, summer 2016. 
2.6 Current and expected performance 
The low level of interest for European VC observed in the early years is reflected in the low returns that 
LPs’ private equity portfolios have generated since their inception; low returns not only compared to 
other EU private equity investment options, but also to international VC investments (Table 2). Seventy-
five percent of LPs have received annual returns (net of fees and carried interest) of more than 11% 
from European buyouts, while only 43% of them are from European VC. Furthermore, 57% of LPs 
achieved net annual returns of less than 10% by investing in EU VC, compared to 40% and 37% of LPs 
investing in Asia-Pacific and North American VC, respectively.    
Table 2. Annual net returns across LPs’ PE portfolios since their inception (% of respondents) 
  < 10% 11-20% >  20% 
 
Buyout 
North American 13 85 2 
Asia-Pacific 27 73 0 
European 25 74 1 
 
Venture 
North American 37 53 10 
Asia-Pacific 40 52 8 
European 57 43 0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Global Private Equity Barometer, summer 2016. 
Regarding annual net return expectations from their PE portfolios, 54% of LPs expected the European 
VC to deliver returns of less than 10% over the next three-to-five years. Moreover, they anticipated that 
buyout transactions in Europe would offer the best private equity opportunities, as almost 80% of LPs 
                                                     
America, Europe and Asia-Pacific (including the Middle East). In the 19th edition of the Barometer 113 private 
equity investors participated, while in the 24th edition (summer 2016) 110 investors.    
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expect annual returns in the range of 11-20%. The low forecasted performance of EU VC is evident, 
not only within the European private equity market, but also across international markets (Table 3).  
Table 3. LPs’ forecast net annual returns from PE in the next 3-5 years (% of respondents) 
  < 10% 11-20% >  20% 
 
Buyout 
North America 10 87 3 
Asia Pacific 29 66 5 
Europe 15 79 6 
 
Venture 
North America 24 64 12 
Asia Pacific 42 51 7 
Europe 54 40 6 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Global Private Equity Barometer, winter 2015. 
 
2.7 Funding gap with the US 
It is evident that European venture capital needs to access more international institutional investors who 
have a potentially higher risk appetite and access to additional pools of capital. Lately, however, we see 
that US institutional limited partners are increasingly among the largest investors in European venture 
capital funds and fastest-growing European tech firms.  
The global economic and financial crisis had a major impact on the level of VC deal flow in both the 
EU and the US. American VC fundraising has recovered more quickly, however, as shown in Figure 7. 
Venture capital fundraising in Europe has been weak, averaging 29% of the amount raised in the US 
since 2006. Moreover, the total annual activity (investment) in the US VC industry ($79bn in 2015) is 
significantly greater than in Europe ($16bn in 2015). Even though the total size of European VC market 
in 2015 increased by 16.3% compared to 2014, venture capital investment in Europe averages 21% of 
the amount raised in the US since 2006 (Figure 8).   
Figure 7. US-EU VC fundraising (capital raised, $B) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook’s 3Q 2016 US Venture Monitor and PitchBook’s 2Q 2016 
European Venture Industry Report. 
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Figure 8. US-EU VC activity (deal value, $B) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook’s 3Q 2016 US Venture Monitor and PitchBook’s 2Q 2016 
European Venture Industry Report. 
Comparing the evolution in VC activity overall and by stage of development in Europe and the US, we 
observe that while angel/seed activity has significantly lagged behind the number of early and late stage 
deals, the number of angel/seed deals has grown considerably during the economic recovery (figures 9 
and 10). Yet, the time at which this change occurred, and the volume of deals closed differ on the two 
continents. For the US the angel/seed activity overcame the early VC activity in 2011, while for the EU 
it was two years later, in 2013. The number of deals closed in the EU in 2015 (3,541 thousands) accounts 
only for the 35% of deals closed in the US (10,293 thousands). 
Figure 9. US VC activity by stage of development ($B) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook’s 3Q 2016 US Venture Monitor and PitchBook’s 2Q 2016 
European Venture Industry Report. 
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Figure 10. EU VC activity by stage of development (€B) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook’s 3Q 2016 US Venture Monitor and PitchBook’s 2Q 2016 
European Venture Industry Report. 
Another important difference between the US and EU venture capital markets is the funding 
distribution. We consider whether funding is spread more thinly in Europe than in the US by looking at 
average amounts invested by company. Figure 11 shows that although European funds invest much less 
in aggregate than in the EU, they support many more companies (conditional on the amount invested). 
While the average investment in the US between 2007 and 2015 was $45.2bn by almost 6,500 
companies, in Europe 3,330 companies invested only $5.87bn. 
Figure 11. US-EU VC average investment per investee company ($M) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on PitchBook’s 3Q 2016 US Venture Monitor and Invest 
Europe/PEREP_Analytics data. 
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3. Limitations of the current EuVECA Regulation 
The first limitation of the current EuVECA Regulation regards the €500 million threshold of the 
manager’s portfolio. At present, if the aggregate assets of a venture capital fund exceed €500 million, 
the manager falls within the scope of the AIFMD and has to seek a regular authorisation under AIFMD. 
This means that the manager can continue to use the EuVECA label, but not the marketing and 
management passports (known as ‘limited grandfathering’).   
The second limitation concerns the types of companies a EuVECA is allowed to invest in. Currently, 
the EuVECA can only invest in unlisted SMEs, companies with fewer than 250 employees and an 
annual turnover of less than €50 million. But this provision has been regarded as narrow and restricted, 
and contradicts the Commission’s primary focus to undertakings that are: i) very small, ii) at the initial 
stage of their corporate existence, and iii) display strong potential for growth and expansion. 
The third limitation has to do with certain EU member states’ strict requirement that funds managers 
pay additional fees to markets in their jurisdictions, even with the EuVECA passport. This practice acts 
as a barrier to Capital Markets Union and in particular to the Commission’s effort to spread venture 
capital funds more evenly across the EU, as well as to eliminate differing registration fees without 
sacrificing the level of investor protection. 
The fourth limitation relates to the cross-border activity of EuVECA. Venture capital funds located in 
larger European countries, where there are pools of capital from a local investor base, can often raise 
funds without the EU-wide passport. But in smaller member states, with fewer domestic investors, 
barriers9 to cross-border fundraising will tend to keep them small and reliant on public money. As a 
result, entrepreneurs and innovators running start-up and scale-up businesses in that vicinity may 
struggle to obtain the funding they need for their business to survive. They will therefore look outside 
Europe to secure funding from investors in other locations, for example the USA. This might carry the 
risk that whole businesses leave Europe to follow capital. 
The fifth limitation concerns the minimum investment threshold of €100,000. Even though the ‘entry 
ticket’ was introduced to ensure consumer protection, it is now regarded as being prohibitively high, 
particular by managers interested in investing in social entrepreneurship funds. Moreover, the fact that 
in some member states domestic funds with similar profiles are marketed with a lower minimum 
investment threshold (in France, for example, the minimum investment is €30,000 provided other fund-
related requirements are met), can partially explain the low investor participation (due to the higher 
risk), as well as the concentration of VC managers in only few member states.    
Finally, another important fact is that the EuVECA Regulation came into force on the same day as the 
AIFM Directive. Yet while the latter triggered immediate actions and reactions across the EU, the 
former appeared to attract little interest. Indeed, as everybody was focusing on the long-awaited AIFM 
Directive, it seems that only a few paid attention to EuVECA. This is even more surprising if we 
consider that one of the key points of EuVECA Regulation was to lower the high entry threshold 
applicable to AIFM by adjusting the regulatory requirements for qualifying VC fund managers. It seems 
that the benefit of full EU marketing access with lower standards, compared to the AIFM Directive, 
wasn’t enough to attract the attention of managers.    
This lack of interest shows that there are fewer VC managers than policymakers might have thought or 
hoped for. Or that VC managers do not operate in a cross-border environment, at least not yet, as the 
analysis showed. Moreover, EU VC fund managers have fewer assets under management than their 
USA counterparts, for example, and thus only operate locally or regionally.   
                                                     
9 For instance, discriminatory tax treatment and varying national requirements on the marketing of funds and fees 
for cross-border notifications.  
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4. The Commission’s proposed changes to the EuVECA Regulation 
To address the first four limitations of the current EuVECA Regulation, in July 2016 the Commission 
proposed to: i) extend the range of managers eligible to market and manage EuVECA; ii) increase the 
range of companies that can be invested in by EuVECA; and iii) make the registration and cross-border 
marketing of these funds easier and cheaper.  
i) Extend the range of managers eligible to market and manage EuVECA 
Allows managers of collective investment undertakings authorised under the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive that manage portfolios of qualifying venture 
capital funds to use the EuVECA designation/label in relation to the marketing of those funds in 
the EU. Access to the EuVECA fund designation would then be extended to authorised AIFM 
managing assets of over €500m. The AIFM would have to register the EuVECA funds and 
comply with specific provisions under the respective Regulation.10 
ii) Increase the range of companies that can be invested in by EuVECA 
Expands the range of qualifying investments permitted under the EuVECA Regulation to allow 
investment in small mid-caps and small and medium-sized enterprises listed on SME growth 
markets. In particular, EuVECA would be permitted to invest in larger companies, including 
unlisted companies with fewer than 500 employees and SMEs listed on growth markets with a 
market capitalisation of less than €200m.  
iii) Make the registration and cross-border marketing of EuVECA easier and cheaper 
Prohibits competent authorities of host member states from imposing fees and other charges 
relating to the cross-border marketing of EuVECA. Streamlines the registration process by 
smoothing and improving the communication between manager and competent authority, as well 
as eliminating duplicative registration. Finally, a successful registration under the EuVECA 
regulation renders a second registration under the AIFM Directive.    
5. What still needs to be done on the EuVECA Regulation  
i) Reduce the entry ticket without sacrificing investors’ protection 
Regarding the fifth limitation, the Commission decided to maintain (for the time being) the entry ticket 
of €100,000. Two further options were under consideration: i) to reduce the €100,000 minimum 
investment without restrictions, or ii) to reduce the €100,000 entry ticket and introduce investor 
protection safeguards. Even though reducing the entry ticket would permit EuVECA funds to be 
marketed to a broader range of investors, the current investor safeguard11 would not be regarded as 
proportionate to the new investors’ potentially lower financial literacy and ability to absorb losses. In 
that case additional safeguards to strengthen retail investor protection would be required.  
However, as some respondents suggested during the European Commission (2016) Impact Assessment, 
one possible solution to these additional safeguards would be to look at the European Long Term 
Investment Funds (ELTIF) Regulation. In particular, this Regulation demands that ELTIF managers: i) 
always have a depository to keep assets safe, ii) comply with rules on spreading assets to prevent too 
                                                     
10 These provisions include: i) the 30% threshold for non-qualifying investments ii) the rules on eligible investors 
and iii) specific disclosures to investors and notifications. 
11 The current safeguard entails a statement in writing that the retail investor is aware of the risks associated with 
the investment in EuVECA. 
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much money going into one asset, iii) use derivatives to manage currency risks in relation to assets they 
hold, and not for speculation, iv) obey limits on the amount they can borrow.12  
Moreover, given the long-term nature of the assets that ELTIF managers invest in, 70% of the capital 
should be invested in more or less clearly defined long-term assets. In addition, the ELTIF manager has 
to ensure that a retail investor with a portfolio of up to €500,000 does not invest an aggregate amount 
exceeding 10% of his/her portfolio in ELTIF, provided that the initial amount invested in one or more 
ELTIF is not less than €10,000. These or some of these requirements would seem to fully serve the 
purpose of lowering the minimum investment.  
ii) Extend passporting rights to third country managers 
Another point of criticism, where the Commission decided not to take action, is the possibility of VC 
funds established in non-EU countries being allowed to use the EuVECA designation. Given the global 
nature of capital markets and the need for the CMU to fit within a global framework, as acknowledged 
in the Green Paper, a key objective is to attract global capital into Europe.  
As this paper showed, Europe’s private equity and venture capital market is much smaller than that in 
the US. The EU should therefore not block itself off from the external expertise and investment by 
restricting EuVECA to managers established in the EU. It is right that the EuVECA should be a 
European regulated and domiciled fund but non-EU managers with the necessary expertise and 
available capital should be able to establish an EuVECA and invest internationally (not just in the EU) 
according to their sector-specific expertise.  
Needless to say, non-European managers should have to meet the same eligibility criteria as European 
ones, so as to ensure a level playing field. The right to manage and market EuVECA should be extended 
to AIFMs in third countries which demonstrably operate equivalent (or proportionate) supervisory 
standards – specifically those third countries to which ESMA has determined there are no obstacles to 
the extension of the AIFMD passport. In addition, a general principle of reciprocity should apply to 
third country managers, meaning that they should bear all the administrative burdens of being EU 
registered (not only regulatory but reporting, taxation, etc.).  
Another important aspect of market access to third country managers concerns the UK and Brexit. 
Given that there are around 25 UK EuVECA managers, their loss will be felt when the UK leaves the 
EU – unless British negotiators are able to secure continued access. Even if the UK joins the EEA or is 
able to negotiate a bespoke deal ensuring access to the single market, the UK will acquire ‘third country’ 
status under relevant directives such as the AIFMD, EuVECA, MiFID and UCITS. This will restrict 
the passporting rights that authorised UK firms currently enjoy under those directives.13 One way or 
another, continental European investors will not want to lose access to (or from?) UK venture funds. 
Unfortunately, the type of agreement the UK will secure depends more on politics than economics. 
iii) Harmonise rules on marketing requirements  
In many member states, rules on marketing requirements are neither easily available nor 
understandable. It has been argued (AFG, 2016) that many texts can apply, which are often included in 
laws and regulations that are lengthy and not available in a language customary in the sphere of 
international finance. As a result, managers who market their funds on a cross-border basis find it 
difficult to identify and understand local requirements. Thus, the cost of research and compliance with 
local requirements is sometimes significant.  
Better coordination at EU level, in particular between ESMA and National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs) regarding the harmonisation of marketing rules and requirements, is of great importance. For 
                                                     
12 ELTIF managers can invest in: i) unlisted companies needing long-term capital (transport, energy, hospitals, 
schools, etc.) ii) certain listed small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), iii) real assets iv) intellectual property 
and other intangible assets v) EuVECA, and European Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF). 
13 Although there are still opportunities to use passports even if the UK does not continue to benefit from single 
market access generally. 
14 | APOSTOLOS THOMADAKIS 
example, it would be helpful if a publication of all marketing rules – such as legal, tax and other practical 
information (e.g. regulatory fees) in the marketing regimes – applying in each jurisdiction, was easily 
and freely available to fund managers. Moreover, the agenda should also include a set of common 
guidelines and standards on the scope of marketing activities. 
6. Policy recommendations for the long term 
The main obstacle to the introduction of the CMU is understanding the real problems facing start-ups 
and SMEs, and convincing member states and national authorities that markets are now global and that 
their firms will gain tremendously from accessing a common pan-European capital market. This will 
be achieved by common legislation on equity, debt crowdsourcing and fund raising. In an era where 
ideas, people, money and goods are mobile and move rapidly, legislation should also be governed by 
common harmonised European rules. But if heavy-handed regulation is accompanied by industry 
consolidation, the result may be fewer market players rather than a wider choice of assets for a broader 
range of investors.  
In an effort to make cross-border VC investment easier, the tax treatment, tax rates and tax relief 
processes should be harmonised across member states. Since the Commission’s Consultation paper (EC, 
2012) on the direct problems linked to cross-border VC investment, nothing has happened. The issues 
are multiple and not only range from the lack or difficulty of access to tax treaties (e.g. difficulty in 
refund of withholding taxes (WHT), difficulty in qualifying for tax relief in the country where the tax 
treaty access is granted), but also to the need of investor tax reporting in other member states or tax 
discrimination between resident and non-resident investment funds.14 Any initiative15 that attempts to 
simplify the whole process and resolve these impediments to the cross-border distribution of funds 
should be warmly welcomed.  
Moreover, like start-ups and SMEs, social enterprises face obstacles in accessing financing. As banks 
are reluctant to provide finance (except against collateral) because of these firms’ business models, it is 
imperative that public-private partnerships be allowed to flourish. The Commission’s effort to offer 
new opportunities for market participants to raise and invest capital in social enterprises throughout 
Europe in a more simplified way, have not been fruitful. The introduction of the European Social 
Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF) Regulation was not as successful as anticipated given that only four 
funds registered so far, with all registrations in 2014 (three in Germany and one in France).16 
With the EuSEF Regulation the focus is on enterprises whose corporate aim is to have a positive social 
impact and address social objectives, rather than simply maximise profit. For social impact investing, 
more flexible legal structures are needed that accommodate the hybrid nature of the social enterprise 
and the matching blended financing that goes with it. But investors should also think more long term, 
rather than expecting short-term returns (‘patient capital’).  
Furthermore, the connection between early-stage funding with start-ups and SMEs is of great 
importance, and the link to the secondary markets should be the next big priority. Crowdfunding, for 
                                                     
14 For example, in many cases investment funds do not have direct access to reduced WHT rates available under 
tax treaties, or the time and costs of recovery of WHT in many cases act as an obstacle to VC managers that want 
to invest in states other than those of their residence, where they are normally taxed at a low level or exempt from 
corporate tax.   
15 For example, imposition of an EU wide limit on the WHT rate equal to the 15% rate foreseen in double tax 
treaties, or even the abolishment of WHT.     
16 Moreover, given the higher costs of running socially driven funds, high registration and marketing fees are a 
considerable extra burden for EuSEF. For instance, an EuSEF manager provided the following breakdown of 
registration costs: €40,000 (external costs), €25,000 (legal advice), €14,000 (costs related to the NCA and ESMA), 
€50,000 (estimation of costs supported by the fund management internally) and €130,000 (internal and external 
arising from post-registration obligations (e.g. ESMA reporting via special interface)). Source: European 
Commission (2016). 
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example, is a great development for start-up capital, but without secondary markets, there is no exit 
strategy and capital remain inaccessibly. 
Finally, another hurdle to overcome is inefficient matchmaking platforms between projects and 
investors. On-boarding more investors (both early-stage and impact) requires better training and 
support. This is especially true for impact investing, which is a relatively new area where lagging and 
discontinuity in the investment value chain is more noticeable.  
7. Conclusion 
While some commentators argue that access to finance for SMEs is improving and others argue that it 
is not, we are all conscious that there is still much to be done to ensure improved access to finance, 
better alternative sources of finance, and better-educated SMEs on how to access that finance. 
Venture capital plays a determining role in stimulating entrepreneurship and young companies, but the 
current EuVECA systems are hampered by imperfections. European venture capital funds are far from 
being systemically relevant and suffer from multiply supply-side failures and structural weaknesses. 
This paper argues that the main problems are the: i) lack of private-sector investors, ii) fragmentation, 
iii) small find size, iv) limited access to international money, v) low investment interest, vi) low current 
and expected performance, and vii) the big funding gap with the US. 
The proposed reform of existing EuVECA legislation aims to improve the situation by extending the 
range of managers eligible to market and manage EuVECA, increasing the range of companies that can 
receive EuVECA investment, and making the registration and cross-border marketing of EuVECA 
easier and cheaper. Next steps forward should be: further broadening of the population of managers that 
can run EuVECA (third country managers); strengthening of passporting arrangements; harmonisation 
of rules on managing requirements; and better blending of public and private money available to private 
managers.  
Finally, even with Brexit, it makes a lot of sense to drive the CMU forward. CMU without the UK 
might take longer to construct, but that makes the need for progress even more urgent. Given the big 
‘known unknown’ of the nature of the relationship the UK will have with the EU, it is necessary to 
make sure that the flow of capital within Europe continues.  
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